Hungary’s election is a question of being careful what you wish for

It takes a particular kind of chutzpah for a senior US official to travel all the way to Hungary just days before parliamentary elections and use a public platform to accuse others of interfering in the vote. Given that the US was largely preoccupied with the war on Iran, this represented a big investment of status and time – even if it was a welcome diversion for the vice-president, JD Vance.

The US is not averse to interfering in other people’s democratic processes, for all the opprobrium it reserves for claims that other states – chief among them Russia – have tried to influence its own. Remember Barack Obama’s warning to the UK about voting for Brexit, or Victoria Nuland, then a US State Department official, handing out “cookies” to protesters in Kyiv in 2013. But Vance’s appearance in Budapest must be one of the most flagrant examples.

This two-day visit was intended to bolster support for Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister for the past 16 years and the widely acknowledged leader of the EU’s awkward squad: a position that suits the current US administration just fine. Nor did Vance hold back. Speaking at a rally for Orban, Vance challenged his audience: “Will you stand against the bureaucrats in Brussels? Will you stand for Western civilisation? Will you stand for freedom, truth, and the God of our fathers? Then, my friends, go to the polls and stand for Viktor Orban!”

Whether the US intervention could swing the election for Orban was another matter – in the event, the Orban era was swept away by Peter Magyar's Hungary election landslide. It cannot be excluded that some of the European aversion to what is seen as Trump’s war of choice on Iran rubbed off on Hungarians of a Trumpian disposition, as it has on voters elsewhere.

The rise of the first really plausible opposition candidate, Peter Magyar, whose Tisza party had a 10-point lead in the polls a week before Sunday’s election, is not to be sniffed at. Magyar presented himself as a counter to Orban in almost every respect, and carried the hope of Orban’s many enemies both inside and outside the country. At which point it might be pertinent to add that Vance’s charges of EU efforts to influence the campaign on Magyar’s behalf – or, more accurately, against Orban – are not without foundation. Brussels has made little secret of where it stands.

As for Magyar, superficially, at least, he can seem to be the non-Orban. He is 15 years younger than the prime minister he has ousted, and telegenic; an adept user of social media, who promises a return to EU democratic and legal norms that could unlock frozen EU funds, and intends to join the euro by 2030. He wants to keep a greater distance from Moscow, and reduce Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy. Among the hopes of his supporters are that he will end restrictions on academia and the media, and the growing centralisation of media ownership, on his watch.

A victory for Magyar is therefore seen as not only ending Orban’s long hold on power, but solving a whole range of other problems. It has also to be said that Magyar’s position is strengthened by current economic difficulties in Hungary, and the same cost-of-living considerations as are afflicting other governments seeking re-election. Disentangling the reasons why Orban has been defeated will have to wait for the days to come.

Orban’s defeat was by no means inevitable. The opposition waged a strong anti-Orban campaign four years ago, but Fidesz emerged with a bigger majority. But what is also of interest is that Magyar also carries more baggage, in terms of having a messy personal life and a history as a Fidesz insider, than may be apparent from outside the country.

Those hoping for sharp policy differences with Orban may be disappointed. He is less militant about it, but Magyar supports Orban’s stance of no more help for Ukraine and ending the war as soon as possible. It is not at all clear that he would lift Hungary’s block on the EU’s proposed €90bn aid package for Kyiv. He is, as any elected Hungarian leader would have to be, opposed to most immigration.

Nor should it be underestimated how far Orban’s outspokenness on these issues has provided a shelter for other EU members who may think, even if they don’t speak, the same way. Slovakia is aligned with Hungary, as, increasingly, is Czechia; Belgium has been forceful in advocating talks with Moscow; and the prospect of fast-tracked EU membership for Ukraine is strongly opposed by Poland. A new government in Hungary will not move the political dial in the EU so very much.

It could perhaps be argued that the defeat of Viktor Orban will be more symbolic than substantial. But symbolism matters in a vote that has been seen for months as pitting EU cohesion and European values against an increasingly autocratic state with a direct line to Moscow, and now Washington.

For everyone’s sake, it is helpful that the election produced a clear result, in which accusations of EU blackmail, US pressure or Russian bots take a remote second place to the clearly expressed will of the voters. The last thing Hungary, or Europe, needs is for the arguments about outside influence that have so sullied the campaign to rage on after it has ended.